

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-05 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 H-01 NSC-05 SS-15 IO-10 AEC-05 OIC-02 /078 W

----- 041878

R 301810Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9106

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4780

CINCLANT

CINCUSAFE

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 6678

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE: FRG AND UK VIEWS ON US ACTION

REF: A. STATE 262168

B. STATE 259740

C. USNATO 6609

D. USNATO 6499

SUMMARY: MISSION EXPECTS FRG AND UK TO ACCEPT MOST US VIEWS ON MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE AS SUMMATION AND REDEFINITION OF WORK ALREADY IN PROGRESS. HOWEVER, BOTH ALLIES WILL OBJECT OT THE IDEA OF CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY AS THE "MAIN DETERRENT AND DEFENSE AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS." THEY WILL ENDORSE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, BUT WILL EXPECT PROGRESS TO BE SLOW. END SUMMARY.

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1. THE FRG BELIEVES US VIEWS ON MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE AND A LONG RANGE CONCEPT FOR NATO, NOW THAT LANGUAGE IS CLEANED UP, ARE NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM WHAT ALLIES WERE ALREADING DOING UNDER SUCH TITLES AS AD-70, BASIC ISSUES, RATIONALIZATION,

STANDARDIZATION, AND FLEXIBILITY. AMBASSADOR KRAPF MADE A SPECIAL TRIP TO BONN TO DISCUSS KEY ELEMENTS WITH DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER. THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE ONLY REMAINING FRG CONCERN IS TO ELIMINATE ANY HINT OF SEPARATING THE THREE PARTS OF THE TRIAD WHICH CONSTITUTES THE NATO DETERRENT (SEE PARA 3 BELOW). THE FRG BELIEVES THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT REPEAT NOT CONDUCT A FORWARD DEFENSE WITH ONLY CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND FEELS THE ALLIES HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE THEY ACHIEVE SUCH A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY, BUT THE FRG STRONGLY FAVORS WORKING IN THAT DIRECTION.

2. THE UK REPS AT NATO HAVE OFFERED EDITORIAL CHANGES TO BOTH ALTERNATIVES ON KEY ELEMENTS. THEY APPEAR TO BE WORKING FROM LOW LEVEL GUIDANCE, AND MISSION DOUBTS THAT DEFENSE MINISTER MASON HAS FOCUSED ON MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. UK WILL PROBABLY GO ALONG WITH US VIEWS EXCEPT THE IDEA OF CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY AS THE "MAIN DETERRENT AND DEFENSE AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS" (SEE PARA 3 BELOW).

3. REF A ARRIVED NOVEMBER 28 AFTER FINAL DPC MEETING NOVEMBER 27 ON MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE (REF C), TOO LATE FOR MISSION TO SEEK INTERNATIONAL STAFF CHANGE IN WORDING OF KEY ELEMENT ON THE "RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESOURCES AND STRATEGY". AS REPORTED REF C, UK IN DPC PCACED BRACKETS AROUND ENTIRE SENTENCE READING "CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE MAIN DETERRENT AND DEFENSE AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, BACKED BY THE THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE." MISSION BELIEVES DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER (FRG) WILL ONLY SEEK DELETION OF WORDS "DETERRENT AND" FROM SENTENCE DURING DECEMBER MINISTERIAL, BUT DEFENSE MINISTER MASON (UK) WILL MOVE DELETION OF ENTIRE SENTENCE. NEITHER ALLY DISPUTES NEED FOR IMPROVED ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES; BUT BOTH FRG AND UK FEAR THAT GREATER EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY THAN ON THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF TRIAD WILL DETRACT FROM DETERRENCE. BOTH BELIEVE THAT DETERRENCE COMES FROM ALL THESE ELEMENTS WORKING TOGETHER; BUT IF ANYTHING, THEY FEEL THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS MOST IMPORTANT. THE FRG ACCEPTS THE IDEA THAT ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY THE MAIN DEFENSE AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, BUT NOT THE MAIN DETERRENT AGAINST SUCH ATTACKS. EVEN IF NATO CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY WERE GOOD ENOUGH TO BLOCK AN ATTACK, IT MIGHT NOT --IN FRG VIEW-- DETER SUCH A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK SINCE AGGRESSORS HAVE OFTEN SOUGHT TO TEST CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES; AND THEY MIGHT DO SO AGAIN.

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BILITY IS MOST IMPORTANT. THE FRG ACCEPTS THE IDEA THAT ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY THE MAIN DEFENSE AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, BUT NOT THE MAIN DETERRENT AGAINST SUCH ATTACKS. EVEN IF NATO CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY WERE GOOD ENOUGH TO BLOCK AN ATTACK, IT MIGHT NOT --IN FRG VIEW-- DETER SUCH A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK SINCE AGGRESSORS HAVE OFTEN SOUGHT TO TEST CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES; AND THEY MIGHT DO SO AGAIN.

4. MISSION RECOMMENDS WASHINGTON CONSIDER REPLACING DISPUTED SENTENCE WITH FOLLOWING: "IMPROVED ALLIANCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE THEREFORE ESSENTIAL TO DETERRENCE AND SHOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH TO DEFEND AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL

ATTACKS."

5. APART FROM STATEMENTS BY THE ITALIAN AND UK DEFENSE MINISTERS THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS ARE IMPROVED, ONE CAN EXPECT THE ALLIES TO OFFER SUPPORT FOR PRESSING NEED FOR RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND FLEXIBILITY. BUT REPEAT BUT THEY QUESTION WHETHER THE US IS SERIOUS ABOUT THESE PROGRAMS. THEY BELIEVE THE US IS INTERESTED IN RATIONALIZING TRAINING ONLY IN THE SENSE OF SELLING US TRAINING TO EUROPE ON THE SAME BASIS AS TO LESSER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. THEY BELIEVE THE US IS UNWILLING TO CONSOLIDATE COMMUNICATIONS SINCE THAT WOULD INVOLVE GIVING UP SOVEREIGN CONTROL OVER COMMUNICATIONS LINKS. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE US IS INTERESTED IN STANDARDIZATION ONLY IF IT MEANS STANDARDIZING ON US EQUIPMENT. THE MESSAGE WHICH THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SHOULD CONVEY TO HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL IS THAT THE US PLANS TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS FORWARD IN EACH OF THESE AREAS BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE 1975 AND HE EXPECTS THAT OTHER ALLIES WILL DO THE SAME.

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 11 JUN 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 NOV 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974ATO06678  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19741185/abbryyvb.tel  
**Line Count:** 129  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A. STATE 262168 B. STATE 259740 C. USNATO 6609 D. USNATO 6499  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 11 APR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <11 APR 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <29-Oct-2002 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE: FRG AND UK VIEWS ON US ACTION  
**TAGS:** MPOL, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
CINCLANT  
CINCUSAFE  
CINCUSAREUR  
CINCUSNAVEUR  
USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT  
USNMR SHAPE

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005